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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
son decision should not have a controlling effect. For that which the legis-
lature gives, the legislature can take away or modify, and the problem be-
comes simply one of statutory interpretation. However, a substantially dif-
ferent and much more difficult question arises in those states, as in
Montana, where the right to vote cumulatively has been conferred by con-
stitutional provision.' In Illinois, the constitutional provision was adopted
as a result of public indignation over the excesses of corporate directors, and
the court in the Wolfson case based its opinion, in large part, on the fact
that cumulative voting was adopted in Illinois as an expression of strong
public policy. The courts of the states with similar constitutional provi-
sions, if and when the question arises, will have to probe into and examine
the history behind the adoption of their constitutional provisions, and if
they find, as the Illinois court did, that their provision arose as a result of
strong public policy and was designed to guarantee minority representation
on corporate boards, the Wolfson decision should become controlling. If, on
the other hand, the courts find that the provision was adopted merely with
the idea of providing the right to vote cumulatively, then they would be
justified in either following or disregarding the Wolfson decision.
It is difficult to determine what stand the Montana Supreme Court
would take in deciding the question posed by the Wolfson case. Its deci-
sion would involve two factors: First, a determination of the public policy
the constitutional convention intended to embody in the constitutional pro-
vision; and second, a consideration of the relative merits of the two theories.
It is doubtful that history will reveal the intent of the constitutional con-
vention.' Therefore the decision would probably be based upon the merits
of the two theories, coupled, of course, with whatever evidence may be avail-
able of the intent of the convention.
DOUGLAS P. BEIGHLE
INCOME TAX-CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS-PROPAGANDA AND INFLUENC-
ING LEGISLATION-During the years 1946 to 1949, petitioners had deducted
severally and jointly in their Federal Income Tax returns contributions
made in those years to the Hamilton County Good Government League, in-
corporated as a non-profit corporation to provide an opportunity for dis-
cussion of matters of civic importance and to advance good government. It
had neither contributed to, nor affiliated with any political party, but had
urged its members to vote and to support legislation that was for the public
good. In addition, committee members of the League were personally re-
sponsible for making studies of necessary legislation to effect public pur-,
poses, and for making endorsements of political candidates to the League,
but these activities involved no expenditure of League funds. Less then
five per cent of the time and effort of the League was found to be of a po-
litical nature. The Tax Court disallowed deductions to the League under
8 0Wright v. Central Calif. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
'For an interesting discussion of the possible intent of the Montana Constitutional
Convention when they adopted this provision, and dealing specifically with the ques-
tion of non-voting stock in Montana, see Note, 1 MONTANA L. REv. 60 (1940).
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sections 23(o) (2) and 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.' On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, held, reversed. A devotion
of less than five per cent of the time and effort of an organization to polit-
ical activities is not a substantial part of its activities within section
23 (o) (2) and contributions to such an organization may be deductible. Sea-
songood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
K lJCUUL ,..IU . IJ. IJI ±J. V C VUUUU.L .JU ,AC U -J. 1UJ JJIU LUCO.
Deductions from gross income. In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) Charitable and other cotributios.-In the case of an in-
dividual, 6ontributions or gifts payment of which is made within
the taxable year to or for the use of:
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation,
created or organized in the U.S. or in any possession thereof or un-
der the law of the U.S. or of any State or Territory or of any pos-
session of the U.S., organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence leg-
islation.' (Emphasis added.)
The problem presented in the instant case evolved from the interpreta-
tions of section 23(o) (2) relating to deductions from gross income based
upon charitable and other deductions. This section was derived from the
Revenue Act of 1921' which in turn had as its basis section G of the Revenue
Act of 1913. The only major change in these sections was made by the ad-
dition in the 1934 Internal Revenue Act' of the words "no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propagonda, or otherwise attempt-
ing, to influence legislation." These words present the crux of the problem
in the instant case.
In one of the earlier cases cited before the Board of Tax Appeals,' the
decision of the court turned upon an interpretation of the word" exclusive,"
and a very strict and narrow interpretation of the word was given. Follow-
ing this case a 1928 decision of the Tax Board' indicated what it believed was
meant by the term " educational"; that "educational" definitely did not in-
'Murray Seasongood, 22 T.C. 671 (1954). .
'Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 23(o) (2), 53 STAT. 880 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 170(c) (2)). Similar wording is found in § 2055(a) (2) of the 1954 Code,
which allows deductions for transfers for public, charitable and religious uses.
BRevenue Act of 1921, § 214, 42 STAr. 241.
'38 STAT. 172 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 501 (c) (3)). This section established
tax exempt organizations.
'Revenue Act of 1934, § 23(o) (2), 48 STAT. 690.
'Bert R. McReynolds, 1 B.T.A. 815 (1925). The Bloomington Consistory Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rule claimed to be a religious organization, basing that con-
tention on the fact that prayers are said, that the members are taught and required
to believe in God and in the immortaliy of the soul, and that the purpose of the
Order was to make men better. It was declared not organized and operated ex-
clusively for religious and charitable purposes.
'Joseph M. Price, 12 B.T.A. 1186 (1928).
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elude anything concerning the government or legislative activities. Although
in form this case was upheld in the following year,' Judge Learned Hand, in
writing the opinion, expressed his regrets to the American Birth Control
League, whose activities, it was held, were not exclusively charitable. Hand
brought out the inescapable fact that there are many charitable, literary,
educational, and scientific ventures that, as an incident to their success, re-
quire changes in the law, and that because of these minor activities the pre-
requisite of exclusiveness is not met, with the result that such organizations
are barred under this particular section of the Code. In a very convincing
manner it was pointed out how a society for the prevention of cruelty to
children and animals needs the positive support of the law to achieve its ob-
jectives, yet if it were to obtain legislation for these purposes it would be
excluded as a tax exempt corporation although it is expressly included in
the section. Then, too, consider state universities which are supposedly ex-
clusively educational institutions. Are they not constantly trying to get
appropriations from the legislature? Should we exclude them from this sec-
tion as not being exclusively educational? This question was summarily
handled in a 1932 case in which the court took judicial notice that a uni-
versity was organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes.'
In a 1929 decision involving a charitable corporation the court stated that
"the general or predominant purpose was to be considered and that the
other features were only a means to an end." Is it possible to reconcile these
conflicting views that interpret the same section of the Internal Revenue
Code?
Tihe epitome of the conflict may have been reached in a 1932 court of
appeals decision wherein a legacy to be expended for teaching, expound-
ing, and propagating the idea of Henry George was held deductible, as
"exclusively for educational purposes," yet in the same case a legacy to a
club incorporated to advocate the Henry George doctrine was held not de-
ductible as the club was not organized exclusively for educational purposes.
This position may have been somewhat clarified in the same year when the
Board of Tax Appeals held that an organization tends to be political rather
than educational when the term "advocate" comes into use.' But if this
were so, why then, in 1935 did a court of appeals hold that the World League
Against Alcoholism was "exclusively educational" in its activities ?' There
was no argument there that the League was not an advocate against alco-
holism although it was well recognized that their main purpose was to ad-
vocate the extinction of alcoholism.
'Slee v. Commissioner. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). The taxpayer's contributions to
the American Birth Control League were held not deductible from his gross income.
Porter v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 673 (2d (ir. 1932).
"John R. Sibley, 16 B.T.A. 915 (1929).
"Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1932). The doctrines of Henry
George dealing with the single taX on land values and international free trade are
set forth in his book, Progress and Poverty.
'John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932). A contribution to the Citizens League
of Cleveland was held not deductible because the activities of such organization
went beyond the scope of education and entered the field of advocacy.
'Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1935). The decision is predicated
upon the theory that alcoholism is not in itself controversial, hence everyone would
advocate the elimination of it.
[Vol. 18,
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A new basis for the court's decision was relied upon in the early 1940 's,
when, in a case involving the Birth Control League of Massachusetts," the
court pointed out the reason for section 23(o) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code stating that it was enacted from a motive of public policy to encourage
charitable gifts and that therefore the sections should be liberally construed
in favor of the taxpayer." A liberal construction was further adopted in
a case the following year wherein a Board of Temperance of the Methodist
Church was allowed deductibility although one of their objectives was to
promote the speedy enactment of legislation pertaining to liquor traffic.'
The majority of the court in the instant case, in contrast to the fore-
going decisions, based its conclusion on the nebulous term "substantial,"
holding that five per cent of the activities was not substantial. Continuity
of interpretation would require a similar holding if a case arose in which
an organization twenty times as large as the one involved devoted five per
cent of the activities to the influencing of legislation. This would amount
to saying that the smaller organization, if incorporated into the larger, could
devote 100 per cent of its activities to influencing legislation and still be tax
exempt, yet this per cent most certainly would be considered substantial if
the smaller organization were independent. Although the decision in the
case is desirable, the means of reaching that decision were incongruous in
light of the hypothetical situation posed. The same decision could and
should have been reached by considering whether the league was en-
gaged in activities constituting propaganda, or otherwise attempting to in-
fluence legislation, within the meaning of those terms in the Code provision.
Had the League been attempting to carry out the technique of the "Big
Lie," which characterizes propaganda, or had they been lobbying or pres-
suring politicians into passing certain laws, which is synonymous with in-
fluencing legislation, then the question could have been asked: Were these
activities substantial? But the facts clearly indicate that under the prac-
tical, limited definitions of those terms as set forth above, the League was
not even engaged in the activities that the Code section provides against.
Nevertheless, the tax court and the court of appeals seemed determined to be
guided by the term "political activities" in construing the section. This
term universally has a far wider scope than that inhering in the terms
"propaganda" and "influencing legislation" and it seems logical to as-
sume that the framers of the code, in drafting this particular provision,
would have used the words "political activities" had they intended such
a broad restriction.
Section 23 (o) (2) will inevitably produce many analogous cases, but if
the intent of the legislators is to be carried out, a proper limitation of the
restrictive terms will have to be observed. By giving precise definitions to
the vague words involved, and incorporating these into the regulations peri-
odically distributed as a supplement to the Code, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue would do much to facilitate and promote a standard of consistency
in the interpretation of this controversial Code section.
RONALD W. LABuiP
"Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940). A contribution to the
Birth Control League of Massachusetts was held deductible.
"Girard Trust Company v. Commissioner, 122 F,2d 108 (3rd Cir. 1941).
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